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Resumen  
Revisión judicial y justicia transicional: juicio reflexivo en 
tres contextos 
Abstract 
Judicial review and transitional justice: reflective 
judgment in three contexts 
Este artículo busca examinar las vías a través de las 
cuales las cortes de revisión constitucional han intentado 
discernir con sentimientos públicos dentro de sociedades 
emergentes de una situación de opresión y conflicto de 
alta escala. Un análisis comparativo de decisiones de 
revisión judicial de la Hungría post–comunista, de la 
Sudáfrica post–Apartheid y de la Argentina post–
dictadura como casos que muestran como los jueces 
han, con mayor o menor éxito, reconocido y engranado 
pedagógicamente sentimientos sociales negativos de 
resentimiento e indignación hacia antiguos víctimarios y 
beneficiarios de violencia. Así, el artículo espera cimen-
tar el camino para investigaciones de mayor envergadura 
sobre uno de las dimensiones más descuidadas de socie-
dades post–confictuales: la influencia pública. 
This article seeks to examine the ways in which courts 
of constitutional review have tried to deal with public 
sentiments within societies emerging from large–scale 
oppression and conflict. A comparative analysis of 
judicial review decisions from post–communist Hun-
gary, post–Apartheid South Africa and post–dictatorial 
Argentina is meant to show–case how judges have, 
more or less successfully, recognised and pedagogically 
engaged social negative feelings of resentment and 
indignation towards former victimisers and beneficiar-
ies of violence. Thus, the article hopes to pave the way 
for more in–depth research on one of the most ne-
glected dimensions of post–conflict societies: public 
affect. 
Palabras clave  
Justicia transicional, revisión judicial, sentimientos 
públicos 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
This paper strives to examine one of the less theorised dimensions of 
transitional justice (TJ): public affect. More precisely, I deal with the role that 
courts play in processes of dealing with negative feelings like resentment and 
indignation as manifested in post–oppression societies. Decisions from Hungary 
after 1989, post–Apartheid South Africa and Argentina after 1983 are compared 
to illustrate how citizens’ affective reactions to political injustice have been en-
gaged through the judicial review of TJ bills. While there is an ample literature 
on trials and their emotional atmosphere (Arendt, 1963; Nino, 1996; Osiel, 
1997, Douglas, 2001), less attention has been devoted to the affective dimen-
sion of the review of bills enabling or blocking prosecutions. In this paper I will 
argue that the judicial review of TJ legislation can also help shape a democratic 
sentimental culture. Different arguments and strategies have been used by dif-
ferent judges, yet their goal was shared: recognising the appropriateness of 
negative feelings towards former victimisers, while also channelling them in 
ways non–detrimental to the normative integrity and stability of democracy. 
I start from the premise that citizens’ resentment and indignation towards 
the former victimisers function as barometers of injustice that draw signals of 
alarm for institutions to intervene correctively. Resentment is associated with an 
injustice committed against oneself; indignation is a response to an injustice 
committed against another. The label “negative” refers to their association with 
displeasure and discomfort. As such, they bear normative weight and constitute 
a proper object of concern for aspiring democracies. However, left unrecog-
nised and unfiltered institutionally, they could degenerate into apathy, or get 
expressed abusively. The paper seeks to illustrate how courts have reviewed TJ 
bills in view of both recognising the moral condemnation implicit in negative 
emotions and of making these emotions compatible with the fundamental value 
of equal respect and concern for all citizens, irrespective of their political past. 
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Hopefully, by the end of the paper I will have disclosed a potentially more subtle 
democratising function of judicial review. 
One caveat before delving into the comparative analysis. I argue that 
some courts have chosen better strategies to recognise and pedagogically 
channel public negative emotions. Since courts are not the only institutions to 
address outraged populations during political transformations it would be diffi-
cult to measure the impact their decisions have had on emotions. Impact is con-
tingent on the courts writing decisions in ways that communicate the constraints 
of equal respect on emotional expression, on the collaboration of the other insti-
tutions, transparency, publicity and exposure in the media, and on victims’ re-
sponsiveness, itself a function of many variables. To the extent that this paper 
claims courts have been “successful”, “success” refers to the quality of the de-
mocratic message communicated to victims, victimisers and the society at 
large, and not to the effectiveness they had in changing people’s emotions. No 
causal link is claimed between courts’ judgments and civil society’s responses. 
2)  HUNGARY 
Hungary made a non–violent transition from authoritarianism to democ-
racy in 1989. The fall of communism was the result of round table negotiations 
between the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s party and the democratic opposition 
(Halmai and Scheppele, 1997). In 1990 the communists experienced a bitter 
electoral defeat. The new Parliament was dominated by a fragile coalition of 
democratic parties. Some of the newly elected MPs were anti–communist dissi-
dents who had faced harsh repression during the one–party rule and who 
wanted justice to be done. This explains why the Parliament spent a lot of time 
and effort trying to get former officials prosecuted through the passing of sub-
sequent laws lifting the statute of limitations for state–sponsored political 
crimes. The 1956 anti–Soviet revolt, which resulted in harsh political oppression 
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and the imposition of a stricter control by the USSR, naturally figured as one of 
the most important injustices in need of correction.  
In November 1991, the MPs passed a law suspending the statute of limi-
tations for all crimes of murder, treason and aggravated assault not prosecuted 
for political reasons during the communist rule (Patacki, 1992). Most of these 
crimes had been committed by the suppressors of the 1956 revolt. The law was 
introduced by two MPs from the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Peter Takács 
and Zsolt Zetenyi. The passing of the law was marked by a fervent, emotionally 
charged debate. The fact that the law would have enabled the state to prose-
cute some of the round table participants was an important issue of contention. 
Legal concerns also came to the fore. The Criminal Code set the statute of limi-
tations for murder at 20 years, for high treason at 15 years and for aggravated 
assault at 8 years (Patacky, 1992: 651). Lifting the statute of limitations violated 
the non–retroactivity principle. In response, the proponents of the law sug-
gested that the violations of human rights by the previous regime had not been 
prosecuted for political reasons and hence, the statute of limitations had only 
started running after 1989. Other concerns were expressed about the definition 
of the offences. Some terms —such as “treason”— lent themselves to multiple 
interpretations and could have been used for political revanchism.  
Because of all these factors, the Hungarian President, Árpád Göncz, re-
ferred the law to the Constitutional Court. Aware of the implications of such leg-
islation for Hungary but also for the entire region, Göncz decided to defer to the 
country’s constitutional forum. A realist would see this decision as a strategic 
gesture meant to avoid political responsibility for such a law, especially when 
communists still permeated the institutional landscape. However, Göncz himself 
had been a dissident, so we might interpret his decision as the result of exem-
plary political judgment by a man who managed to distance himself from his 
own political biography and who wanted to ensure that the integrity of democ-
racy did not get undermined by a hasty law violating its guiding principles. 
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Before analysing the decision, it is important to examine the status of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and the legitimacy it enjoyed at the time. The 
Court emanated from the decisions of the round table was the product of the 
politically negotiated transition. The law for the functioning of the courts had 
been agreed upon in the 1989 negotiations and had been passed by the last 
communist Parliament. The judges in the Court had been selected partly at the 
roundtable, partly by the newly elected Parliament.  
The Court began to function in 1990 and, by the time the Takács–Zetenyi 
law was submitted for review, it had already established a record of independ-
ence and counter–majoritarianism. Thus, we can say that, due to the wide im-
plications and the legally problematic assumptions of this law, the President 
purposely delegated the decision to a young Court, which had however been 
working as an active check on the first inexperienced democratic Parliament. 
The representativeness and the legitimacy enjoyed by the Court naturally 
weighed in favour of deferring to its opinion (Halmai and Scheppele, 1997: 159–
160). 
The President’s petition was based on legality concerns: the principles of 
non–retroactivity, of predictability and certainty of law (11/1992 (III.5) AB h). An-
other concern was the vagueness of the law’s terms. The Constitutional Court 
shared most of Göncz’s concerns and, in a unanimous decision, struck down 
the first attempt to prosecute communist abuses. The Court used arguments 
against the vagueness and indeterminacy of the statutory language and em-
phatically proclaimed that the 1991 law disregarded the basic principles of the 
1989 Constitution. 
The judges decided to focus on the purely formal requirements of the 
Rechtsstaat. This was reflected in their attitude towards the proponents’ emo-
tional requests that moral and political discontinuity be affirmed with the previ-
ous regime. The change of system should not be separated from the require-
ments of a state under the rule of law, the constitutionalists argued. The old law 
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retained its validity, there was no distinction between “pre–Constitution” and 
“post–Constitution” law. No historically symbolic statements about the nature of 
the communist regime were made.  
The judges chose the formal argument out of prudential concerns about 
the destabilising effects of such a bill but also because, being at the beginning 
of their mandate, they needed national and, most importantly, international rec-
ognition. The didactic message towards the outraged Parliamentarians was that 
discontinuity should be affirmed though a break with the old habit of violating 
the principles of the rule of law and not by selective justice. By dismissing the 
idea that justice required a sacrificing of legality, the Court was giving the indig-
nant dissidents a lesson in equal respect for all. This position was vehemently 
contested and yet seemed the best approach under the volatile political circum-
stances of the transition. The Court wrote: “A state under the rule of law cannot 
be created by undermining the rule of law” (2086/A/1991/14, 1992: 633). Moral 
purges could not withstand the test of legality. Thus, the Court saw its historical 
mission as a watchdog for a limited conception of legitimacy equated with legal-
ity. A cautious concern for the rights of the potential defendants meant that, for 
the moment, Hungary had not yet come up with a legitimate way of engaging its 
past, no matter how legitimate the dissidents’ resentments were.  
While their judgment was applauded internationally for preventing 
scapegoatism, the decision could not bring the Court any domestic support. The 
next couple of years brought repeated attempts by the Parliament to suspend 
the statute of limitations. The first decision came across as a post–communist 
“original sin” (Czarnota, 2001), the sin of neutralising the past and failing to 
morally repudiate it. From the point of view of post–conflict, emotionally mobi-
lised societies, courts appear to legitimise themselves and to capitalise public 
support —both for themselves and the political system— by drawing a thick line 
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between the present and the past1. On this account, the line the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court drew was not thick enough. 
As a consequence, at the beginning of 1993, the Parliamentarians who 
drafted the 1991 law made use of another legal strategy to get around the Con-
stitutional Court’s decision: they voted for a so called “authoritative resolution” 
—an act which provided interpretive guidelines for an existing law— meant to 
exempt the years between 1944 and 1989 from the validity of the statute of limi-
tations (Halmai and Scheppele, 1997: 164). The emotional need for recognition 
and rectification was there to stay. 
This time, the review was requested by a number of opposition MPs. 
Again, the Court struck this document down on the basis of non–retroactivity 
concerns. In addition, it challenged the Parliament’s choice of means, claiming 
that, instead of using problematic legal artifices they needed to enact a statute 
and be aware of how their decision would affect numerous citizens. The Court 
communicated to the Parliament that constitutional democracy, as well as their 
institutional position as representatives of the Hungarian people, demanded that 
they chose the appropriate means in legislation. The dissidents’ thirst for satis-
faction did not entitle them to by–pass the publicity requirement. Again, the 
pedagogical message was clear: no matter how entitled they were to their re-
sentments, the legislative body could not violate democratic equality. 
The third attempt to get justice done was a statute meant to amend the 
Criminal Procedure Act in order to make it compulsory for prosecutors to charge 
some criminals, even if the statute of limitations had expired. As expected, 
President Göncz again refused to sign this into law and deferred to the Consti-
tutional Court. The judges were consistent in striking it down as unconstitu-
tional, providing the same reasoning they did for the other previous attempt: the 
commitment to democracy cannot be violated in legislation or prosecution.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, the kind of satisfaction that the Peruvian public derived from the resolution 
of Fujimori’s trial in April 2009 (Bajak, 2009) or, as I will show further on in this article, the ex-
citement surrounding the overturning of the Argentinean amnesty laws. 
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The dissidents only made progress by adopting the language of interna-
tional legal standards. They also avoided vagueness by specifically referring to 
the 1956 events (Morvai, 1993). In order to enable the prosecution of those re-
sponsible for the suppression of the anti–communist revolt, the law “Concerning 
the Procedure in the Matter of Certain Criminal Offences During the 1956 Octo-
ber Revolution and Freedom Struggle” made use of the language of “crimes 
against humanity” and “genocide.” This move could have been a strategic re–
phrasing by a governing democratic coalition that did not rank well in the pre–
election polls and that hoped to get some satisfaction before losing power.  
For reasons already discussed, the President chose to send the law to 
the Constitutional Court for abstract review. This time, due to the valid use of 
the language of international law, the judges struck down only some parts of the 
law. In decision 53/1993 (X. 13) AB h, the judges addressed the Parliament and 
explained that they had to distinguish between crimes that did and crimes that 
did not count as crimes against humanity (Halmai and Scheppele, 1997: 167). 
In upholding those parts of the law that dealt with crimes committed during the 
1956 revolt, the Court engaged in a detailed account of why such international 
standards had been created and why they were relevant for Hungary. From the 
text we can see that the Court clearly assumed the role of a guardian of law and 
engaged the young Parliament in an analysis of the requirements that needed 
to be met in view of the alignment with the community of democratic nations. 
Thus, the Parliament had first to clearly distinguish between the real 
crimes against humanity and ordinary domestic crimes. The Court defined for 
the Parliament “crimes against humanity” as homicide committed on a massive 
scale and as part of a large regular attack. Not all crimes that the vehement 
Parliamentarians wanted to include under the umbrella of the 1993 law qualified 
as such. Through their insistence on precision, the Court instructed the MPs in 
the limits that equal respect placed on the actions of the state against all poten-
tial defendants. It advised the proponents of the law to revise it in view of these 
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corrections. Once again, the message of the Court was that the dissidents’ insti-
tutional choices for dealing with the past violated democratic standards.  
In this effort, the Constitutional Court was joined by the Supreme Court 
judges who dealt with the first appeals in concrete cases where the revised ver-
sion of the 1993 law had been used by the prosecution. Unfortunately, the Par-
liament had not fully integrated the recommendations of the Constitutional Court 
and had failed to formulate the procedural aspects of the law. This led to condi-
tions of legal uncertainty. Consequently, the Supreme Court judges did not want 
to take the responsibility for deciding these cases and asked for the abstract 
review of the modified version of the 1993 law. The Constitutional Court agreed 
with the reasoning of the Supreme Court and decided the law was unconstitu-
tional on the basis of its procedural incompleteness (Morvai, 1993: 33–34). The 
Parliament was again asked to make a set of revisions so that concrete cases 
could finally be tried without violating the principle of equal respect.  
From the judgments of the Supreme and Constitutional courts we can 
deduce an even stronger concern with procedural fairness once prosecutions 
became possible. Dealing with such serious offences needed special caution so 
as to avoid miscarriages of justice. Given the precarious position of young insti-
tutions, the international attention on the transition processes and the lack of 
experience with such processes, the high courts chose prudence and made use 
of all the possible safeguards in order to set Hungary in what they thought was 
the right direction. A concerted effort by the judges of different courts was 
meant to keep the polity away from abusive, emotionally motivated moral 
purges and to exemplify a concern with the rights of all interested parties. A se-
ries of subsequent exemplary judgments by the Hungarian judges explicitly pro-
voked the enraged dissidents to reflect on what they wanted to do in the name 
of their otherwise correct evaluation of past injustices, and invited them to re-
spect the commitments that they themselves had made to democracy. The re-
silience of the dissidents’ moral hatred did not distract judges from their forma-
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tive task. The decisions feature clear explanations why not all forms of engaging 
the past were compatible with democratic equal respect and concern for all. 
Legality was not sacrificed for the sake of an unreflective search for emotional 
satisfaction. 
3) SOUTH AFRICA 
Without the amnesties associated with the political negotiations that led 
to the end of Apartheid, “we would have been overwhelmed by the bloodbath 
that virtually everyone predicted as the inevitable ending for South Africa” (TRC, 
1998: 22). One of the landmarks of the negotiated transition to democracy was 
the “Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act” instituting the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), signed by the President of the republic on 
the 19th of July 1995. The purpose of the commission was to look into the na-
ture, causes and extent of human rights violations committed during the Apart-
heid regime. Most controversially, the document stipulated that amnesty will be 
awarded to persons who make full disclosure of their political crimes (TRC, 
1998). 
In order to carry out this work, three committees were created: a “Com-
mittee on Human Rights,” dealing with gross violations, a “Committee on Repa-
ration and Rehabilitation,” meant to gather information and to make recommen-
dations for reparations to the President, and a “Committee on Amnesty,” having 
the power to grant amnesties for violations of human rights motivated politically 
and on condition of full disclosure of the truth by applicants. 
Fervent debate took place around the morality, the prudence and the le-
gal status of such an institutional response to a past of symmetrical barbarism 
(Bhargava, 2000). Numerous victims saw the establishment of the TRC as rob-
bing them of justice. Empirical research in South Africa reveals the dissatisfac-
tion that many felt regarding the subordination of retributive justice to reconcilia-
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tion (Bell and Ntsebeza, 2001; Gibson, 2002). I shall not engage here in an 
analysis of the debates around the TRC. This section is concerned with one 
less talked about event in South Africa’s transitional saga, namely the challenge 
to the constitutionality of the TRC initiated by the families of some prominent 
resisters to the Apartheid regime. Given our interest in the way the judiciary can 
engage citizens’ negative emotions within transformational moments, I shall 
focus on the Constitutional Court’s arguments in the “Azanian Peoples Organi-
zation (AZAPO) and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and oth-
ers”, case CCT 17/96 of 25 July 1996.  
The plaintiffs were the families of black resistance legend Steven Biko, 
killed in police custody in 1976, of lawyer Griffiths Mxenge, killed by security 
policemen in 1981, and of African National Congress activist Fabian Ribeiro, 
murdered in 1986 (Saunders, 1996). The relatives could not reconcile them-
selves to the idea of civil and criminal indemnity for the brutal murders of their 
beloved. Their lawyers claimed that the amnesty obliterated rights to justice, be 
it in the form of criminal prosecutions or civil compensation. Therefore, they 
challenged the constitutionality of section 20(7) of the “Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act”, which provided that no person, organization or 
the state should be criminally or civilly liable for any act or omission that 
amounted to human rights violations committed for “political reasons”. The 
plaintiffs claimed that section 20(7) was in conflict with Section 22 of the Consti-
tution, which stipulated that “[e]very person shall have the right to have justicia-
ble disputes settled by a Court of law or, where appropriate, another independ-
ent or impartial forum” (CCT 16/96). The constitutional status of the Epilogue to 
the Constitution —the text enabling the Parliament to pass amnesty provisions 
in the TRC statute— was contested. The plaintiffs argued that the Epilogue was 
not part of the constitutional text and, therefore, was not covered by section 
33(2), outlining the rights overriding clauses. 
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Desmond Tutu and the African National Congress did not like the news 
of this challenge and labelled the legal action as a self–righteous attempt to un-
dermine reconciliation efforts. In contrast, the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court showed a better and more sensitive understanding of the emotional costs 
victims had to pay in exchange for reconciliation. The Court carefully legitimised 
the moral outrage of the victims’ relatives by recognising their validity as re-
sponses to suffering and uncertainty over the fate of their beloved. Throughout 
the text of the decision, Judge Mahomed expressed deep concern for the emo-
tional strain of the population, both before and after the negotiated transition. 
Nevertheless, the Court ruled in support of the Parliament’s decision to institute 
a TRC with amnesty powers. Although judges claimed that their only concern 
was to see whether Section 20(7) of the TRC statute was constitutional or not, 
they engaged in a multilayered argument as to why the TRC was the optimal 
choice for the post–Apartheid political circumstances. In retrospect, we can say 
that, understanding the emotional hardship that the very existence of the TRC 
created for victims and their families, as well as the novelty of such a mecha-
nism for dealing with a past of symmetrical barbarism, judges provided an 
elaborate defence of the legislature’s decision. The kind of representation and 
voice that the political elites envisaged for the victims was going to take a new, 
non–retributive form. The task of the Court was to persuade the victimised of 
the validity of this alternative form of recognition, just as valuable as that en-
abled by criminal justice and civil compensation. 
The introduction to the decision retells the story of the unsavoury past 
and its legacies for the present. The oppressiveness of the regime is juxtposed 
to the increased levels of anger in the subordinated black population. The diffi-
culty of building a democracy on the ruins of the Apartheid state is acknowl-
edged. The “deep emotions”, the “indefensible inequities”, and the impossibility 
of reversing the past required that society turn its back on desires for retribution. 
The Epilogue of the Constitution is taken as a testimony of the will of the people 
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—through their representatives— to look forward to peace, unity, reconciliation 
and reconstruction (CCT, 16/97: 3–4). It is on the basis of this declaration of 
intention in the Epilogue that the Parliament legislated the statute creating the 
TRC. In this sense, the Court emphasises, the TRC was the product of a de-
mocratic will and hence, legitimate. With great care and by referencing section 
232(4) of the Constitution, the Court explained how the Epilogue, under which 
the TRC statute had been legislated, was as much a part of the constitution as 
any other section. As such, it correctly entitled the Parliament to exercise am-
nesty powers for both civil and criminal offences as a means to move beyond 
hatred and towards a future of unity and mutual understanding.  
Next, the Court engaged in a long discourse about the tragic dimension 
of the South African transition and a defence of the Parliament’s choice of insti-
tutional means to deal with the past. The discourse showed respect for the 
plaintiffs’ anger and sought to acknowledge the legitimacy of such emotions, at 
the same time explaining why the Court had to stand by the Parliament’s deci-
sion. Criminal and civil liability for individual wrongdoers —as well as civil liabil-
ity for organisations and the state— was subordinated to the greater social 
good of finding the truth for individuals and reconciliation for society. A different 
kind of recognition was to ensue from the proceedings of the TRC: the recogni-
tion of the victims’ right to know the truth and to forgive. Let us now reconstruct 
the arguments that the Court prepared for the outraged relatives of Apartheid 
resisters. 
Judge Mahomed first dealt with the issue of immunity from criminal 
prosecutions. He began by acknowledging the emotional frustration of a victim’s 
family when amnesty got granted to their relative’s killers: “Every decent human 
being must feel grave discomfort in living with a consequence which might allow 
the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the streets of this land with impunity” (CCT, 
16/97: 11). Since the abuses took place a long time ago and since the previous 
regime was based on lies and secrecy, there was no reliable data to ensure an 
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accurate establishment of responsibility. As a consequence, amnesty was a 
safer bet from the point of view of justice. A democratic concern with the risk of 
abusive trials recommended the commission. In addition, a TRC where survi-
vors could meet and share stories was more likely to give voice to all sides and 
hopefully lead to reconciliation. However, without the incentive of freedom from 
criminal prosecutions, relatives of victims would never get the truth about the 
lost ones, while the victimisers themselves would have to carry the guilt and 
anxiety associated with culpability. 
Disregarding some problematic psychological assumptions about the re-
lationship between truth, healing and the anxiety that human rights violators 
experience, the Court expressed here a clear concern with the emotional re-
sponses to human rights violations. More importantly, a very acute understand-
ing of the importance of a stable emotional environment for the furthering of po-
litical and social reform transpired. Had amnesty not been proclaimed, prosecu-
tions would have been selective, information would not have been readily avail-
able and truth would not have surfaced. Negative emotions would have re-
mained alive and would have prevented the crossing of the historical bridge to-
wards a brighter future.  
However, says the Court, we must not forget that the amnesty was not 
unconditional. It was only upon full disclosure of the truth and only for politically 
motivated crimes that immunity was granted. The Committee for Amnesty was 
to closely follow the criteria for identifying politically motivated actions. In addi-
tion, the Court emphasised the fairness of the amnesty: this was not a Latin–
American style, self–proclaimed amnesty by a military junta losing power, but a 
democratically chosen transitional measure. 
Once the lack of a domestic obligation to prosecute had been dismissed, 
the Court proceeded to the claim that international law required that gross hu-
man rights abuses be prosecuted. The Court responded by showing how inter-
national legal instruments could not become valid law for South Africa until 
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made so through legislative enactment. Since that had not happened yet, there 
was no international duty to prosecute. In addition, the type of conflict that had 
plagued the South African society could not be subsumed to the kind of con-
texts the Geneva Conventions dealt with (CCT, 17/96: 26–31).  
The next step was the justification of the annulment of civil liability for in-
dividual wrongdoers. By way of a semantic analysis of the term ”amnesty”, the 
Court explained why it could not be limited to criminal liabilities. It would have 
been counterproductive to proclaim amnesty for one kind of offences only. Hori-
zontal consistency required such an approach. 
The issue of the civil liability of the state raised the bar of justification 
higher. In the end, the Court got around this problem by pointing to the scarcity 
of resources and the need to channel them into national reconstruction policies. 
Lastly, the immunity from civil liability by organisations to which the victimisers 
belonged was redeemed by pointing to the fact that it was due to the efforts of 
these organisations —in negotiation with the alternative elites— which democ-
racy came about. Their contribution to democracy required that they be let free 
of civil obligations.  
In conclusion, Judge Mahomed expressed the Court’s conviction that 
“the Constitution authorised and contemplated an ‘amnesty’ in its most compre-
hensive and generous meaning so as to enhance and optimise the prospects of 
facilitating the constitutional journey from the shame of the past to the promise 
of the future” (CCT, 17/97: 46). The Court thus fully embraced the judgment of 
the lawmakers and, in its turn, decided to uphold the constitutionality of the TRC 
statute. 
Given the interest of this article, it is important to stress the Court’s atten-
tion to a certain dimension of legal claims: the affects. The text shows the 
judges understood the importance of a stable emotional climate of the transi-
tion, as well as a sober awareness of the material and political constraints that 
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limited the prospects of redress. The deep fractures in the South African society 
and their emotional expression in hatred and resentment were a constant 
theme in the Courts’ arguments. The judges acknowledged that such emotions 
were legitimate, but tried to persuade the public that recognition did not neces-
sarily have to take the form of retribution. To the contrary, finding the truth and 
being given voice within the TRC constituted an alternative, yet just as valid, 
form of institutional recognition. The TRC provided a compensatory venue for 
these feelings to be expressed in public. A rather strong, and some might say 
unfounded, belief was expressed that social catharsis would ensue from en-
counters between victims and victimisers. But, under the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the judges reflectively endorsed the decision of the Parliament. 
Through their arguments, they tried to engage the judgments underlying the 
victims and relatives’ negative feelings in a way that they thought was most 
conducive to the strengthening of the South African democracy: asking them to 
accept the political experiment in truth and reconciliation that the commission 
embodied.  
Given the exclusion of retribution from the institutional arrangement and 
the emotional frustration, the complainants were disappointed with the decision 
of the Court. The Azanian People’s Organisation claimed that “[I]t takes away a 
fundamental right of the people to apply to the courts for adjudication. We think 
this has important consequences for democracy in this country” (Saunders, 
1996). In spite of the Court’s commendable attempt to talk to their emotions, the 
attempt to appease resentment and indignation by truth rather than retribution, 
and their argument as to the inevitably selective and abusive form that criminal 
justice would take, did not meet the South Africans’ expectations. The inevitable 
institutional and normative limitations of the TRC, its problematic relationship 
with the Prosecutorial Office, the lack of a holistic evaluation of the Apartheid 
regime, and their faulty attendance to the victims’ needs (Graybill, 1998) left the 
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immediate families of the victims, as well as large segments of the population, 
dissatisfied and angry.  
In the Biko case, the dissatisfaction was later fuelled by the fact that, in 
spite of the TRC’s rejection of amnesty applications by Biko’s killers, trials were 
not held. The official reason was the lack of sufficient evidence. A long time af-
ter the denial of criminal justice, Biko’s son was still writing of the bitter taste 
that negotiated settlements had for victims and their families: “White South Afri-
cans must reckon with history for what it is and not for what they wish it to have 
been. We can then choose to roll up our sleeves, and occupy our place as citi-
zens of significance who get on with the business of rebuilding South Africa or 
we can, once more, palm this responsibility off to our children. If we choose the 
latter, then I am afraid my children will be making these very points many years 
from now. Only then it may not be through the power of the pen but ‘by any 
means necessary’” (Biko, 2006). 
As the statement above shows, there is a chance that, left unvindicated, 
the disappointment and lack of trust in institutions will reproduce themselves 
across generations. This is not true only for the case of Biko’s son. Empirical 
studies have shown that the post–Apartheid failures of justice contributed 
though they do not fully explain to the widespread culture of impunity and 
violence in today’s South Africa2. The promise of the Constitutional Court was 
left empty by the judiciary’s failure to prosecute individuals whose amnesty re-
quests had been denied by the TRC. 
To sum up, while the Court did its best to acknowledge the victims’ de-
mands and to persuade them of the merits of a truth and reconciliation forum, 
the novelty of the institutional experiment and the subsequent failures of the 
justice system left many dissatisfied. The demand that they be content with 
knowing the truth and work for national reconciliation did not provide all victims 
                                                 
2 For such an argument see Dempster, 2002 and Nagy, 2004. Resilient systemic economic 
inequalities and racial tensions are probably the main factors behind heightened levels of vio-
lence. 
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with the kind of recognition they would have found persuasive and that would 
have made them support the young democratic regime. It was inevitable that 
not everybody would accept justice as recognition as an alternative to retribu-
tive justice (du Toit, 2000). When even the modicum of retributive justice al-
lowed by the transitional arrangement failed to ensue on the recommendations 
of the TRC, resentments and indignation remained unappeased. The culture of 
impunity emerging from the failure to deliver the kind of justice the public appre-
ciated left hatreds alive and led to the increased use of violence for solving con-
flicts within the South African society (Dempster, 2002 and Nagy, 2004). 
4) ARGENTINA 
The end of the Argentinean military regime only came with the defeat in 
the Falkland Islands war at the beginning of the 1980s. During the military rule, 
the Supreme Court of the land had repeatedly petitioned the leaders to clarify 
the status of missing individuals, but was repeatedly snubbed by a junta claim-
ing not to have any knowledge of what was happening (Jacobson, 2007). Just 
before losing power, the military passed a self–amnesty law, the 22924 National 
Pacification Law stipulating a blanket amnesty for all subversive and counter–
subversive acts that had taken place between May 25, 1973 and June 17, 
1982. In this way, the officers exited power ensuring that human rights abuses 
—the most notorious of which were the “disappearances” of a large number of 
Argentinean citizens suspected of leftist, counter–regime activities— would not 
be prosecuted.  
The Argentinean Truth Commission (CONADEP), established in Decem-
ber 1983 by President Alfonsín, reported 8,960 victims of “disappearance” 
(HRW, 2001). Immediately upon taking power, the President argued against the 
constitutionality of the National Pacification Law, which eventually got nullified. 
As a consequence, the prosecution of the top military and of the left–wing guer-
rilla fighters who had committed massive human rights abuses began. 
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In order to appease the military, the highest military Court was charged 
with the task of prosecution. But, when it refused to hear cases, the proceed-
ings were transferred to civil courts (Nino, 1996). In addition, the President 
asked that the “due obedience” defence be considered valid. This meant that 
lower ranks could defend themselves on grounds that they had been merely 
observing orders from their superiors. Due to the fragile balance of power after 
1983, Alfonsín and his team of legal experts opted for prudence and restraint in 
the quest for justice. His intention was to have an exemplary trial of the top 
leadership of the army in order to appease the social demand for justice, while 
not making transitional justice measure look like a targeted attack on the institu-
tion of the army.  
The 1985 trial of the junta leaders was met with great public excitement 
(Nino, 1996). Generals Videla and Massera got life time in prison, Agosti four 
and a half years, Viola, seventeen years, Lambruschini, eight years. Graffigna3 
and all three members of the third military junta were acquitted (Di Paolantonio, 
2004). The trial’s shortcoming was the not–so–clear stance on “due obedience.” 
This ambiguity opened the way for further prosecutions. Naturally, the military 
closed ranks and started threatening to disrupt the already fragile peace (Di 
Paolantonio, 2004). In response, the President and his aides prudently pre-
pared two laws meant to limit the impact of prosecutions. The first was the “Full 
Stop Law” (23492 Punto Final, 1986), which gave courts and prosecutors 60 
days to press charges. Unexpectedly, the courts proved very diligent in prose-
cuting numerous cases before the term expired working even during the vaca-
tion period. As a consequence, the military organised a serious rebellion, which 
pushed the passing of the “Due Obedience Law” (23521 Obediencia Debida, 
1987), limiting responsibility only to the highest ranks. This latter law stopped 
proceedings for all the trials against middle rank officers. The Supreme Court 
                                                 
3 Videla, Massera and Agosti were the members of the first military junta that took power after 
deposing President Isabel Perón in 1976. General Viola replaced Videla for a few months in 
1981 as head of the junta. Admiral Lambruschini took over from Massera as the chief of the 
navy. Garrafigna was commander of the air force after Agosti. 
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upheld the constitutionality of the law, challenged by human rights groups. In 
this way, the march to justice had been halted. The final blow for victims and 
their families came shortly after in the form of President Menem’s pardon of all 
officers already convicted for crimes committed during the “dirty war.” 
From a social–emotional point of view, these events pushed the Argen-
tinean society in two directions. On the one hand, widespread apathy, a feeling 
of disempowerment and heightened tolerance towards the former oppressors 
who continued to live next to their victims constituted a pathological feature of 
the Argentinean transition (Kaiser, 2002). On the other hand, mobilised civil so-
ciety groups, especially around the relatives of the murdered and “disap-
peared”, began to put increased pressure on the subsequent administrations. 
Political mourning became a new form of democratic participation and so were 
marches against impunity. Street demonstrations, litigation and various public 
rituals marked public resistance and abhorrence towards the unjust laws (Hum-
phrey and Valdeverde, 2007). 
Sometimes groups of activists took justice into their own hand and en-
gaged in public rituals of disclosure, humiliation and stigmatisation of torturers 
and victimisers. The so–called eschraches brought together the children of the 
disappeared. The rituals were meant to shake the conscience of the Argentin-
ean society and rally citizens in an effort to unmask and ostracise the hundreds 
of assassins living freely under the shelter of the amnesty laws and Menem’s 
pardons. The demonstrators would gather in front of the torturer’s house, name 
him as a torturer, warn his neighbours about his living there, distribute pam-
phlets, play music, present improvised theatre scenes, make lots of noise, write 
denunciations on the sidewalks and walls of the house and symbolically throw 
red paint on the doorsteps of the victimiser’s lodging. Failure by the state to ad-
dress the resentment and indignation at the impunity of human rights violators 
pushed citizens into symbolic stigmatising acts of punishment, shaming and 
public humiliation, all in the hope of drawing both the state’s and the apathetic 
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citizens’ attention to an unrectified past. The passing of time did not diminish 
the strength of the call for justice. Its anchoring into the emotions of the victims’ 
relatives did not allow resignation to settle in (Humphrey and Valdeverde, 2007: 
180). In this way, human rights groups drew a signal of alarm about the legiti-
macy deficits that the Argentinean democracy suffered from. 
The judiciary eventually took up the provocation that the victims’ associa-
tions launched. The legal loophole that allowed the first breakthrough was the 
fact that neither the amnesty laws, nor Menem’s pardons covered crimes 
against babies. After some failed attempts to find the truth about the disap-
peared in the late 1990s (Abregǔ, 2000), progress came with the prosecution of 
cases dealing with the theft of babies from victims of torture. The military sys-
tematically took the children away from their prisoners and subsequently 
changed their identity in view of their adoption by childless families among their 
ranks. Once the systematic practice of stealing babies was uncovered, prosecu-
tions of officers formerly pardoned by President Menem began. In between 
1998 and 1999 a number of high officers were indicted. Pressure from the rela-
tives of the disappeared increased by the day.  
It was during the investigation of a case of a kidnapped couple and their 
baby that one of the most important Court decisions for the fate of justice in Ar-
gentina was passed. On March 6, 2001, Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo of the 
Buenos Aires Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the “Full Stop” and “Due Obe-
dience” laws were unconstitutional. An amicus curiae brief was submitted by 
The Centre for Legal and Social Studies on behalf of the Grandmothers of the 
Disappeared. The two amnesty laws were found to be in conflict with Articles 29 
and 118 of the Constitution, as well as with international and regional human 
rights documents4. As to Article 118 judge Cavallo explained how the crimes 
                                                 
4 I owe the summary of the 188 pages decision to the Human Rights Watch Report, “Argentina” 
and to the CELS report, “Pedido de inconstitucionalidad de las leyes de punto final y obediencia 
debida – Caso Poblete”, 1st of November 2007, available on-line at 
http://www.cels.org.ar/documentos/index.php?info=detalleDoc&ids=3&lang=es&ss=&idc=592, 
accessed, November 20, 2008.  
 Papeles del CEIC # 60, septiembre 2010 (ISSN: 1695–6494)
Mihaela Mihai 
Judicial review and transitional justice: reflective judgment in three contexts 
 CEIC http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/60.pdf
 
Mihaela Mihai 
 
Papeles del CEIC, 2010 
—22—
 
committed by the junta were serious enough to be considered “crimes against 
humanity” and, as such, subject to universal jurisdiction and benefiting from no 
statute of limitations. Judge Cavallo thus restarted the struggle against impunity 
in Argentina. He was shortly joined by other federal judges who reached similar 
conclusions in the cases they heard. In response to the judicial initiative and the 
public mobilisation, in 2003 the Parliament passed a law invalidating the am-
nesty protections (25779, 2003). In order for this repudiation of the law to be-
come valid, the sanction of the Supreme Court was needed.  
The Supreme’s Court’s invalidation of the Amnesty laws was delayed un-
til 2005. In its ruling (S1767, 2005), the Court made reference to international 
and regional human rights documents that had priority over domestic legislation, 
as well as the precedent of the Barrios Altos case decided by the Inter–
American Court of Human Rights (Jacobson, 2007). Like in the Barrios Altos 
precedent, said the Court, the Argentinean impunity laws were ad hoc and vio-
lated the state’s internationally sanctioned duty to prosecute (CELS, 2005). The 
actions of the military violated the human being in her humanity and were per-
petrated by state agents in the exercise of their functions. As such, they quali-
fied for the status of “crimes against humanity”, crimes recognised by interna-
tional law at the time when the Argentinean atrocities were committed. Conse-
quently, wrote the Court, there was no violation of the retroactivity requirement 
of nulla poena sine lege.  
Next the Court examined whether the 2003 law passed by the Argentin-
ean legislature violated the principle of the “separation of powers.” The judges 
claimed that the Parliament was entitled to issue declarations of principles with 
symbolic political content. The passing of the law did not constitute an infringe-
ment on the judicial power. The repealing of the laws thus marked the begin-
ning of prosecutions. Soon the courts were busy trying officers for various viola-
tions of human rights. In this way, the longing for justice that victims kept mani-
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festing in various forms in the public sphere was getting its due attention from 
the state. 
There are a few elements that make the Argentinean case interesting for 
this paper. First, it is important to see how, given the fragile equilibrium of forces 
after 1983, the democratic forces had to choose limited measures in favour of 
justice and eventually postpone the quest for rectification. The commitment to 
democratic norms had not been betrayed by the Argentinean institutions and 
public, it just needed to wait for propitious conditions. Second, the emotional 
mobilisation of the victim’s families and of other forces within the civil society 
points to a healthy understanding of the relationship between citizens and the 
state which, even if not pervasive, served as a corrective force during the transi-
tion. The political use of emotions —grief, anger, indignation, resentment— was 
successful in bringing home the lesson that the past is an important part of the 
national narrative and cannot be ignored.  
Once the conditions changed, the state in general and the judiciary in 
particular recognised the legitimacy of the societal cry for justice and acted in 
order to correct past wrongs. Looking back and realising the importance of ad-
dressing wrongs committed by the state’s agents, Judge Cavallo reflectively 
judged that it was time to end structural impunity and begin treating the victims’ 
families with the due respect and concern. It was time the victimisers were 
taken out of the safe heaven that amnesty laws provided, it was high time the 
victims and their families’ negative feelings were given proper recognition by the 
state. His decision signalled that a polity’s violation of the principle of equal 
concern and respect made it a lesser democracy. 
5) LESSONS TO BE LEARNT 
The cases examined illustrate how the emotional atmosphere of adjudi-
cation can complicate the task of the judges reviewing legislation meant to en-
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able transitional justice. We can see that the high courts’ decisions heavily de-
pended on their level of legitimacy, the nature of the former regime, the level of 
mobilisation of the civil society, the actors who passed transitional justice bills 
and those who initiated the review process. Yet all three courts were faced with 
the negative emotions of the proponents or objectors to these bills and with the 
task of engaging these emotions without undermining the integrity and stability 
of the new democratic order. Comparatively, the South African Court proved to 
be the most concerned with recognising the validity of negative affect, the Hun-
garian was most concerned with avoiding emotionally motivated abuses, while 
the Argentinean judges were pushed to act in response to indignant claims for 
redress. 
The Hungarian Court decided to emphatically communicate how democ-
racies deal with the agents of an unsavoury past. The fear of emotionally moti-
vated political revanchism made the Hungarian Court engage in a sustained 
pedagogical effort with the enraged Parliament. In doing so, it tried to act as a 
guardian of democratic equal concern for all citizens, be they dissidents or op-
pressors. The judgment was naturally framed by the features of the political and 
historical context. The Court was interested in getting international recognition 
and attempted to lock in human rights standards. These objectives could not 
have been achieved if the resentful and indignant dissidents had been given 
carte blanche. Therefore, ample arguments were dedicated to persuading the 
proponents of the law to accept democratically acceptable means of engaging 
with a painful past. While partially for pure strategic reasons, the judges decided 
to only allow for the prosecution of the most abhorrent crimes against humanity, 
sanctioned by the international human rights regimes. They thus managed to 
prevent abusive prosecutions of former communists. However, its lack of care 
for the recognition needs of the victims diminished the impact that this decision 
could have had in re–establishing equality. An asymmetrical attention to the 
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interests of the potential defendants left many anti–communist dissidents unsat-
isfied.  
Among the courts examined in this paper, the South African Constitu-
tional Court showed the greatest concern with the emotional dimension of tran-
sition. The arguments the judges formulated in upholding the constitutionality of 
the TRC display both an acute sensitivity to the emotional atmosphere of the 
transition and a sense of realism as to how difficult it would be to satisfy the 
public’s outrage at the Parliament’s chosen mechanism of transitional justice. 
Although they did everything they could to gain the challengers to the side of 
the TRC, their arguments failed to change the addressees’ emotional assess-
ment of the situation. In spite of the Court’s laudable, exemplary judgment, the 
lack of precedent for the institutional experiment with the TRC, coupled with the 
subsequent failure of criminal courts to follow up on the Commission’s recom-
mendations, placed some above the law and rejected otherwise legitimate 
claims for vindication. Negative emotions reproduced themselves in time and 
keep emerging in public discourses. Yet the imperfect form of TJ in South Africa 
is not the only explanatory variable. The nature, scale and duration of the 
Apartheid regime, as well as the resilient economic and racial inequalities can 
help us understand the violent realities of this society today. 
Federal judges acted as a transformative force within a context in which 
severe impunity stained the Argentinean democracy. Displaying political and 
moral leadership, they ended the institutional complacency over the morally 
problematic settlement of 1983. Benefiting from the support of human rights and 
victims’ groups, the courts provoked the elective institutions and the public to 
reflect on the internal contradictions of their incomplete democracy. In response 
to the courts’ challenge, the legislative and the highest Court of the land nullified 
the abhorrent laws that had protected violators for long, painful years. In this 
way, the Argentinean democracy came one step closer to a social reality that 
corresponded to the guiding principles of equal concern and respect for all citi-
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zens. The corrective force of victims and their families’ resentment and indigna-
tion made its contribution to the cause of democracy and continues to do so 
today in response to injustices that emerged long after the transition. 
The analysis of these cases strengthens the idea that successfully deliv-
ering the democratically right decision implies recognising the legitimacy of 
emotional responses to injustice but also launching a challenge to individuals to 
reflect on the kind of actions that emotions motivate. While resentment and in-
dignation as responses to injustice cannot be suppressed without reproducing 
the injustice, how they get expressed in public needs to be a permanent con-
cern of democratic institutions. Different courts will engage emotions differently, 
depending on the variables constraining and enabling judgment. This paper will 
have hopefully showcased various attempts by the judiciary to engage with the 
complex emotional environment of their work in transition. 
6) BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abregû, M., 2000, “Human Rights after the Dictatorship: Lessons from Argen-
tina,” en NACLA Report on the Americas, vol. 34, issue 1, pp. 12–18.  
Act 9–34, 1995, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, available 
on-line at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm, accessed No-
vember 20, 2008. 
Arendt, H., 1976, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, Pen-
guin Books, UK. 
Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and others, case CCT 17/96, decided on 25 July 1996, p. 
11. 
Bajak, F., 2009, “Peru’s Fujimori gets 25 years for death squad,” Associated 
Press, April 7, 2009, 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090407/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/lt_peru_fujim
ori_trial, accessed April 29, 2009. 
Bell, T., y Buhle Ntsebeza, D., 2001, Unfinished Business: South Africa Apart-
heid and Truth, RedWorks, South Africa. 
Bhargava, R., 2000, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies,” en R. Robert I. 
y D. Thompson, (Eds.), Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commis-
sions, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, pp. 45–67. 
 Papeles del CEIC # 60, septiembre 2010 (ISSN: 1695–6494)
Mihaela Mihai 
Judicial review and transitional justice: reflective judgment in three contexts 
 CEIC http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/60.pdf
 
Mihaela Mihai 
 
Papeles del CEIC, 2010 
—27—
 
Biko, N., 2006, “Putting Tu and Tu together,” Steve Biko Foundation, available 
at http://www.sbf.org.za/index.htm?sbf_prog_1.htm~main, accessed No-
vember 18, 2008. 
Case “Simon, Julio Hector y otros s/privación ilegítima de la liberdad, etc.” 
S1767 (XXXVIII), available on-line at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,CASELAW,ARG,4562d94e2,472
1f74c2,0.html, accessed November 20, 2008.  
CELS, “Las leyes de Punto Final y Obediencia Debida son inconstitucionales, 
Síntesis del fallo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación que re-
suelve la nconstitucionalidad de las leyes del perdón,” pp. 5–6, available 
on-line at 
http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/sintesis_fallo_csjn_caso_po
blete.pdf, accessed 20 November 2008. 
CELS, “Pedido de inconstitucionalidad de las leyes de punto final y obediencia 
debida – Caso Poblete,” 1st of November 2007, available on-line at 
http://www.cels.org.ar/documentos/index.php?info=detalleDoc&ids=3&la
ng=es&ss=&idc=592, accessed November 20, 2008.  
Constitutional Court Decision on the Statute of Limitations no. 2086/A/1991/14 
March 5, 1992, reproduced in Neil Kritz (Ed.), 1995, Transitional Justice, 
vol. 3, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, pp. 629–640. 
Czarnota, A. W., 2001, “Foreword to Special Issue: Jus and Lex in East Central 
Europe. Socio–Legal Conditions of the Rule of Law amid Post–
Communist Transformations”, en East Central Europe/ECE, vol. 28, 
no.1, pp. i–vi. 
Dempster, C., 2002, “Guns, Gangs and Culture of Violence”, BBC report, 10 
April, 2002, available on-line at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1919382.stm, accessed January 28, 
2009.  
Di Paolantonio, M., 2004, “Tracking the Transitional Demand for Legal Recall: 
The Foreclosing and Promise of Law in Argentina”, en Social Legal Stud-
ies, vol. 13, pp. 351–375.  
Douglas, L., 2001, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the 
Trials of the Holocaust, Yale University Press, New Heaven CT. 
du Toit, A., 2000, “The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as 
Acknowledgment and Justice as Recognition”, en Rotberg and Thomp-
son (Eds.), Truth v Justice, pp. 122–140. 
Gibson, J.L., 2002, “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of 
Amnesty in South Africa”, en American Journal of Political Science, vol. 
46, pp. 540–556 
Graybill, L.S., 1998, “Truth and Reconciliation capitalised”, en Africa Today, vol. 
45, no. 1, pp. 103–131.  
 Papeles del CEIC # 60, septiembre 2010 (ISSN: 1695–6494)
Mihaela Mihai 
Judicial review and transitional justice: reflective judgment in three contexts 
 CEIC http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/60.pdf
 
Mihaela Mihai 
 
Papeles del CEIC, 2010 
—28—
 
Halmai, G., y Scheppele, K.L., 1997, “The Hungarian Approach to the Past”, en 
A.J. McAdams (ed.),Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New 
Democracias, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 
Human Rights Watch Reports, 2001, “Argentina, Reluctant Partner: The Argen-
tine Government's Failure to Back Trials of Human Rights Violators”, vol. 
13, issue 5 (B), available on-line at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/argentina/index.html#TopOfPage 
accessed November 26, 2008. 
Humphrey, M., y Valverde, E., 2007, “Human Rights, Victimhood, and Impunity: 
An Anthropology of Democracy in Argentina”, en Social Analysis, vol. 51, 
issue 1, pp. 179– 97. 
Jacobson, D., 2006–2007, “A Break with the Past or Justice in Pieces: Diver-
gent Paths on the Question of Amnesty in Argentina and Colombia”, en 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 35, pp. 135–
204. 
Kaiser, S., 2002, “Eschraches: Demonstration, Communication and Political 
Memory in Post–Dictatorial Argentina”, en Media, Culture and Society, 
vol. 24, pp. 499–516. 
Law of National Pacification No. 22924, Sept. 22, 1983, [XLIV–A] 1681 cited in 
Jacobson, D., 2006–2007, “A Break with the Past or Justice in Pieces: 
Divergent Paths on the Question of Amnesty in Argentina and Colombia”, 
en Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 35, p. 
187. 
Ley 25 779, September 3, 2003, B.O. 30.226. 
Morvai, K., 1993, “Retroactive Justice Based on International Law: A recent De-
cision by the Hungarian Constitutional Court”, en East European Consti-
tutional Review, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 33–34. 
Nagy, R., 2004, “Violence, Amnesty and Transitional Law: ‘Private’ Acts and 
‘Public’ Truth in South Africa”, en African Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 1–28. 
Nino, C.S., 1996, Radical Evil on Trial, Yale University Press, New Heaven CT. 
Osiel, M., 1997, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law, Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick NJ. 
Patacki, J., 1992, “Dealing with Hungarian Commnists’ Crimes”, en RFE/RL 
Research Report, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 21–24.  
Saunders, J., “Biko family lose battle over S. Africa truth body”, en Reuters, 
26th of July 1996, available on-line at http://www.hartford–
hwp.com/archives/37a/020.html, accessed November 18, 2008. 
TRC, 1998, Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
vol. 1, paper 1, Juta Cape Town. 
 
 
 Papeles del CEIC # 60, septiembre 2010 (ISSN: 1695–6494)
Mihaela Mihai 
Judicial review and transitional justice: reflective judgment in three contexts 
 CEIC http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/60.pdf
 
Mihaela Mihai 
 
Papeles del CEIC, 2010 
—29—
 
Protocolo para citar este texto: Mihai, M., 2010, “Judicial review and transitional justice: 
reflective judgment in three contexts”, en Papeles del CEIC, vol. 2010/2, nº 60, CEIC (Cen-
tro de Estudios sobre la Identidad Colectiva), Universidad del País Vasco, 
http://www.identidadcolectiva.es/pdf/60.pdf 
Fecha de recepción del texto: julio 2010 
Fecha de evaluación del texto: agosto 2010 
Fecha de publicación del texto: septiembre 2010 
 
